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Constant development of software requires updating our Internet of Things (IoT)
devices regularly. Some services such as transportation, health care, surveillance
and electronic payments require high availability, even during a software update.
IoT updates in urban scenarios require connectivity based on the Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) and long range connection with adequate speed. Normally, these re-
quirements are provided by cellular network (i.e., using a SIM card) to connect
to the Internet. This option presents several disadvantages: it is very expensive
and it exposes IoT devices to security threats due to the permanent connection
to the Internet. These challenges could be addressed by leveraging long-range
broadcast communication (e.g., FM broadcast). IoT devices periodically listen
for and receive updates through such a communication infrastructure, without
actually being connected to the Internet.
This thesis presents a system to provide software updates for IoT devices through
long-range broadcast communication technologies. A prototype has been devel-
oped based on the concept of “seamless updates”. This allows performing software
updates in the background, hence ensuring the availability of a device during the
installation time of an update. This seamless update process was implemented
on an embedded device (i.e., a Raspberry Pi 3) with a Linux-based operating sys-
tem. Furthermore, a web-based backend has been implemented. Such a backend
allows IoT developers to upload their updates targeting a specific class of devices
and schedule when the update will be sent. The security goals of integrity and
authentication are accomplished by signing the updates in the backend and veri-
fying it at the IoT device. Moreover, a performance evaluation is performed for
the system upgrade service with different parameters to sign the updates.
Keywords: IoT, provisioning service, Over-the-air programming, OTA,
seamless updates, software upgrades, IoT security
Language: English
2
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to thank God for giving me the opportunity to study
abroad and accomplish my dream of getting a master’s degree.
Secondly, I would like to thank the NordSecMob Programme for giving
me the opportunity to be part of such an inspiring and multinational pro-
gramme, broaden my knowledge in the security field, and develop personally
and professionally. Gratitude goes to the Ministry of Science, Technology
and Telecommunications of Costa Rica for granting me a scholarship that
made it possible to attend such a programme. I highly value all the help
and support I got from the study coordinators and the staff of Norwegian
University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and Aalto University during
these two years.
More specifically, I thank Mario Di Francesco for guiding me during my
master’s thesis work over the past months: thank you Mario for all your
lessons, patience and support. In addition, I would like to give thanks to
Pranvera Kortoçi, my advisor, for all the support and advice during this
period. I would also like to thank the people of the Computer Science De-
partment for helping and encouraging me every day while writing this thesis.
Special thanks go to Maria, Mariusz and Gopika.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my friends in Finland that supported
and were with me in the good and the bad times. Particularly, my flatmates
Klaudia and Nadin, with whom I shared this journey. In addition, I would
like to give credit and show gratitude to the friends I made in Norway who
always stayed connected and cheered me up, sharing life even from distance.
Big thanks to Kasia, Nicole, Simone and Verena who visited me during my
period in Finland and brought me a lot of joy.
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family and friends
from Costa Rica: Muchas gracias a toda mi familia por su apoyo incondi-
cional durante estos dos años de maestría, sinceramente que he sido bendecido
por Dios al tener una familia tan maravillosa.
Le doy gracias a mi papá por su fortaleza y apoyo a pesar de su enfer-
medad. A mi mamá por sus constantes frases de apoyo y sus oraciones. A
3
mi hermano German José por su soporte y guía en los momentos difíciles.
A mi cuñada Gisela por sus consejos y muestras de afecto. A mi hermano
Ricardo por sus videollamadas y buenos consejos sobre vida social y deporte.
A mi cuñada Stefany por su constante colaboración ante cualquier problema
y su cariño. Además, quisiera agradecer especialmente a mi hermana Ana
Marcela por apoyarme, ayudarme, soportarme y por siempre presente, al
igual que a mi cuñado Rafa que me ha brindado su apoyo y soporte durante
todo este tiempo desde Holanda.
También quisiera darles las gracias a mis sobrinos por sus muestras de
cariño y afecto. Cada video, foto o mensaje me hicieron sentir cerca, a pesar
de la distancia, pero además me impulsaron a seguir adelante. Le agradezco
a Fabián por sus enseñanzas sobre Clash Royale para mis momentos de dis-
tracción; a Diego por sus comentarios graciosos que siempre me alegran el
día; a Matías por enseñarme sobre seguridad (“shoulder surfing”) cuando con
4 años se aprendió mi patrón para desbloquear el teléfono y por ser una per-
sona con la que puedo compartir mi obsesión por Pokémon; a Ignacio por
sus sonrisas y ocurrencias que le alegran la vida a cualquiera; a Paula por su
ternura, sus besos y frases de cariño que me levantaban el ánimo cada vez que
me sentía mal y a Elena, mi chinita hermosa, por darme la bendición de ser
tío una vez más de éste lado del mundo, fue una experiencia increíblemente
gratificante. ¡Los amo demasiado!.
Además, quiero agradecer a mi abuelita hermosa por su ejemplo y sus
oraciones, a mis tíos y tías por su apoyo, y especialmente a mis primos y
primas incondicionales que desde diferentes partes del mundo se mantuvieron
pendientes de mi vida, apoyándome, guiándome y mandando sus mensajes
de cariño. Al pertenecer a una familia de mucho más de 50 parientes, se
me hace difícil escribir todos los nombres; sin embargo, quiero darle gracias
especiales a María Isabel y a Ivonne quienes a pesar de la distancia me han
acompañado constantemente en ésta travesía.
Por último, quiero agradecer a todos mis amigos de la infancia, colegio,
universidad, trabajo y de la vida quienes se han hecho presentes por medio
de mensajes, llamadas, palabras de aliento y ayuda. ¡Son increíbles!.
Los llevo a cada uno en el corazón y les deseo las mayores bendiciones en
la vida. Sin ustedes ésta maestría no se hubiera logrado.
In summary, thank you, kiitos, takk, muchas gracias and pura vida!
Espoo, July 31, 2017
José Bernardo Víquez Zamora
4
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AWS Amazon Web services
ANATEL National Telecommunication Agency in Brazil
DoS Denial of Service
DSA Digital signature algorithm
DTV Digital television receivers
DV Digital video
ECDSA Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
FICORA Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority
FM Frequency modulation
FS File system
GB Gigabytes
GUI Graphical user interface
HSM Hardware secure module
HTTPS Hypertext transfer protocol over TLS
HW Hardware
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoT Internet of things
IP Internet protocol
JAR Java archive
JDK Java development kit
MB Megabytes
MHz Megahertz
MITM Man-in-the-middle
MVC Model-view-controller
NIST National Institute of standards and technology
NOOBS New out of the box software
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
OS Operating system
OTA Over the air programming
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter formulates the problem addressed by this thesis work. After-
wards, the chapter presents the contribution of the research, the implemen-
tation and the evaluation. Finally, the chapter details the structure of the
thesis with a brief explanation of each chapter.
1.1 Problem Statement
Constant development of software requires updating our Internet of Things
(IoT) devices regularly. Some services such as transportation, health care,
surveillance and electronic payments require high availability, even during a
software update.
Typically, IoT updates in urban scenarios require connectivity based on
the Internet Protocol (IP) and long range connection with adequate speed.
Normally, these requirements are provided by cellular network (i.e., using a
SIM card) to connect to the Internet. This option presents several disad-
vantages: it is very expensive and it exposes IoT devices to security threats
due to the permanent connection to the Internet. In addition to these disad-
vantages, the IoT devices possess non-updatable software requiring physical
manipulation to update them and normally during the update process the
IoT device becomes unavailable to the users.
These challenges could be addressed analyzing the current infrastructure
in the cities to broadcast digital data, the latest hardware and software solu-
tions in terms of wireless software updates, as well as the security recommen-
dation of international organizations (e.g., NIST and OWASP) to provide a
wireless, secure, wide and efficient upgrade service for IoT devices.
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1.2 Contribution
In this thesis work, a solution for an IoT application provisioning service is
presented leveraging long-range broadcast communication technology with a
defined components, architecture and security requirements. Additionally, a
prototype has been developed based on the concept of “seamless updates” to
provide a system upgrade service for embedded devices. This system allows
performing software updates in background, hence ensuring the availability
of a device during the installation time of an update. Furthermore, a Web
Application has been implemented to provide an interface for IoT application
developers to upload their device-specific software updates. The implementa-
tion applies digital signature security for the update files to provide integrity
and authentication leveraging an Oracle library normally used by Android
to sign their applications. The thesis includes a performance evaluation of
the prototype and its different digital signature algorithms, based on security
recommendations.
1.3 Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
background about the current scenarios on IoT provisioning services and
long-range broadcast communications technology, as well as the computer
security recommendations for these services. Chapter 3 presents the design
of the proposed solution of an IoT application provisioning service, its com-
ponents and use cases. Chapter 4 details the implementation of a seamless
updates prototype on an embedded device, the development of a Web Appli-
cation to upload software updates and a performance evaluation of the system
upgrade service. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with suggestions for
future work.
Chapter 2
Software updates for embedded de-
vices
This chapter describes the main concepts related to software provisioning
systems. Firstly, the chapter provides some examples of existing software
updates based on over the air programming. Moreover, it introduces the
concept of seamless updates for embedded devices, focusing in IoT devices.
Subsequently, the chapter reviews the transmission of data over long-range
broadcast technology. Finally, the chapter presents the security provided by
the current software upgrade systems.
2.1 Over the air programming
Over the air programming (OTA) refers to different mechanisms to update
the software in embedded (IoT) devices wirelessly, hence requiring no physi-
cal access to reprogrammed devices [8]. These mechanisms include updating
applications, modifying the configuration of devices or exchanging security
keys. Currently, OTA supports software upgrades for several devices includ-
ing set-top boxes, sensors and mobile phones. Thus, this upgrade process
enables the manufacturers to improve the software, extend its functionalities
and fix security vulnerabilities by providing new software versions instead of
requiring physical maintenance of the devices.
To explain the OTA process, we review three different OTA application
scenarios:
• Wireless sensor networks. This scenario provides communication
by some multi-hop short-range technology such as ZigBee. OTA in
WSN distributes the update by some gateways near end devices. Hence,
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transmission of data is restricted by the distance between nodes. For
example, in WSN using ZigBee in an urban scenario the sensors or
actuators should be positioned less than 100 meters from each other [9].
• Digital television (DTV) receivers. This scenario sends software
updates by leveraging television broadcast services. DTV receivers
download the update packages from a broadcaster that defines the
strength of the signal, operation frequency and communication chan-
nel [10]. Usually, the broadcaster requires a transmission license pro-
vided by a local authority (e.g., Finnish Communications Regulatory
Authority (FICORA) in Finland and National Telecommunication
Agency (ANATEL) in Brazil). Normally, receivers download the up-
date only when the audio and video interfaces are turned off. One of
the drawbacks of this solution is that the download process could be
interrupted if the user turns on the DTV receiver. Moreover, DTV de-
vices allow only partial updates of their system. However, these devices
possess two updatable partitions: the current and the backup partition.
This dual partition characteristic enables the device to rollback in case
of a problem with the new update [10].
• Android devices. Android devices apply OTA to distribute new ver-
sions of their software and to update the applications installed in their
platform. However, this requires the devices to be connected to the
Internet. Typically, these devices are polling OTA servers for new up-
dates, which provide the download Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
and information to display to the user about the update. Afterwards,
the update is downloaded by the device. Once the download is finished,
the system verifies that the update contains a valid certificate. The ap-
proval of the user is necessary to start the installation. Subsequently,
the device reboots to apply the update. Finally, the device reboots
normally when the system is updated completely. During this process,
the device becomes unavailable, i.e., the user waits for several minutes
the end of installation and reboot processes [11].
The structure of the OTA update is different for every system. For in-
stance, Android 5.0 systems implement block OTA updates [12]. This mech-
anism updates the entire partition as a block and removes the individual file
check of the partition. This block creates only a binary patch and ensures
that the device installed the actual update. After the update is performed,
the boot process verifies that the file system of the device was not altered
by a virus (e.g., malware) during the upgrade process. In case the system
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detects the file system was tampered during the update execution, the veri-
fication boot fails and the device returns to its previous version. This block
OTA leverages two types of updates:
• Full update. This method generates a complete copy of the system.
This increases the size of the update, but it is easier to realize. If the
size of the image is large, this approach may require long time to update
the device.
• Incremental update. This method creates a diff binary between the
current block and the updated one. This reduces the size of the images.
However, it requires longer time to generate the binary.
As previously mentioned, in some cases OTA requires IoT devices to be
connected wirelessly to the Internet to download their latest update. Typi-
cally, the devices access wireless Internet through cellular networks. Hence,
this connectivity requirement represents higher costs (i.e., cheaper solutions
are presented in [10]) for the companies to provide their devices with Internet
connectivity and expose them to several Internet issues that will be addressed
in Subsection 2.4.
In addition to wireless data transmission, OTA assumes reliable commu-
nications. Normally, broadcast communications are unreliable and to address
this problem, it is necessary to leverage forward error correction techniques,
e.g. Reed-Solomon coding of packets [13]. The main idea of this technique
consists of sending a redundant number of packets to the end devices, i.e.,
if the whole update package length is m, the sender will send k additional
redundant packets. The end device will receive at most k + m packets. How-
ever, in case a packet is lost, it is possible to recover the missing information if
at least m distinct packets are received. Therefore, this mechanism decreases
the throughput but increments the robustness of the system in presence of
packet loss [13].
2.2 Seamless Updates
The seamless updates concept was introduced by Google in 2016, and it is
currently implemented in Android Nougat 7.0. This concept is based on
the updating process of the Chrome operating system (ChromeOS). The
implementation in ChormeOS requires three partitions on the hard drive of
the device: one stateful partition for the profile logs and the home directory,
as well as two partitions for the root of the file system [3]. The purpose of
this solution is to execute the update installation in background, hence this
technique provides additional availability to the devices.
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Although seamless updates increase the availability of the devices, they
are implemented only for certain Android devices because it requires two
systems A and B installed in the hard drive. Each system is provided with
their own group of partitions, e.g., boot, root and vendor. This group of
partitions are also known as slots (slot A and slot B). While the system is
running in slot A, a process known as daemon runs in the background1. If
an update is found, the process installs it in slot B. Furthermore, each slot
contains a variable that stores the number of attempts the bootloader tries to
boot with the slot2. Once the installation is finished, the process adds some
value greater than zero (e.g., 1, 2 or more) to the attempts variable of slot
B. Hence, next time the device boots the system tries to run slot B with the
installed update. If the boot process is successful, slot B is set as bootable
and the attempts variables are cleared for the rest of the slots. Otherwise,
slot B is set as non-bootable after the attempts are over and the system tries
to boot from a slot set as bootable. Figure 2.1 shows the update process of
ChromeOS [3].
Figure 2.1: Autoupdate process of ChromeOS [3].
If neither of the systems is bootable, then the bootloader starts a recovery
process to reinstalled the system (i.e., ChromeOS reinstallation is showed in
1 In Android is called update_engine daemon [14]
2 In Android is called remaining_attemps
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Figure 2.2). This process requires a recovery image saved in a USB drive or
SD card [4].
Figure 2.2: Reinstallation process of ChromeOS [4].
This approach provides robustness to the devices in case the updating
process fails and also allows the device to continue running while the instal-
lation process of the update is being performed [14].
However, one of the drawbacks of this concept is that devices require twice
as much as memory space to host two systems at the same time. Google has
presented a solution with a compressed file system such as SquashFS. This
compress file system is more efficient than a .tar.gz file. When the system
boots, it mounts the compressed partitions as read-only file systems. To
achieve read/write access of these partitions it is necessary to utilize UnionFS,
that enables the system to write over a read-only file system. These files
systems are combined to save space on the drive of the device, as well as to
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perform seamless updates on Android devices more efficiently [15].
2.3 Long-range broadcast data transmission
Cities around the world hold the infrastructure for long-range broadcast data
transmission. The transmission of data in the radio spectrum is performed
over licensed, unlicensed or mixed bands. Normally, government authorities
allocate the spectrum and assign frequencies to the licensed users over a re-
gion [16]. Within the spectrum there are unused frequencies at a certain time
and location, known as whitespaces [17]. To identify whitespaces efficiently,
the radio devices are provided with cognitive radios capabilities to dynam-
ically determine which band is available to transmit information depending
on the frequency, time and geolocation [18]. To share the radio spectrum
between all of its users is necessary to provide some regulation models in-
cluding Licensed Shared Access (LSA), Priority Access (PA) and Authorized
Shared Access (ASA) [19].
In 2011, IEEE published the first standard for wireless communications
over television whitespaces. This provides access to a wide area (i.e., 20-30
km). The standard leverages frequency bands between 54 MHz and 862 MHz
(i.e., VHF/UHF TV broadcast) [20]. Several studies evaluate the possibility
to implement wireless broadband access on TV whitespaces (e.g., [17, 21]) or
to complement existing infrastructure for mobile data delivery (e.g., [22, 23]).
In addition to TV whitespaces, there are underutilized frequencies present
in the frequency modulation (FM) band. One example of data transmission
over FM frequencies is the timetable displays in the bus stops in Finland. In
fact, their data updates are broadcasted over FM [24].
Furthermore, register-transfer level (RTL) dongles with software defined
radio (SDR) capabilities provide a wide band radio scanner. Depending on
their specification these dongles are able to receive signals in the range from
52 MHz to 1766 MHz [25]. These RTL-SDR dongles could be connected to
IoT devices by USB and extend their functionality by receiving data wire-
lessly over long-range communication technologies such as TV, FM or DV
(i.e., digital video) broadcast. Such a data transmission provides a cheaper
solution than cellular networks to obtain their software updates and requires
no Internet connection.
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2.4 Computer security
Security includes several properties that are addressed in this thesis work [26]
:
• Confidentiality. Enables secrecy of the information by allowing only
authorized users to access sensitive information. Moreover, provides
privacy to users, so unauthorized users cannot obtain their data.
• Integrity. Guarantees that the information is not altered by any unau-
thorized user when it is being transmitted, processed or stored.
• Availability. Ensures that the system is usable and accessible when
an authorized user requires it.
• Authentication. Identifies who is performing certain actions, includ-
ing the sender of information, the executor of the process or the author
of the data. The authentication process should be performed each time
someone tries to access resources in the system.
• Authorization. Grants or denies access to the resources of the system.
• Non-Repudiation. Establishes that users cannot deny the authorship
of their actions.
All of these security properties are required to analyze the security in a
system, as well as to define its security goals. For example, OTA requires
evaluating the security properties to provide a successful upgrade system to
the end devices. Furthermore, provisioning services support authentication
and integrity. These properties are obtained by leveraging asymmetric cryp-
tography. This type of cryptography involves a pair of keys: one private and
one public. Such keys are owned by the companies developing the software
update. The software update file is signed with the private key. Signatures
provide integrity to the update file in case an attacker tampers the file during
the upgrade process. Additionally, the update includes a certificate with the
public key signed by a certified authority to identify the author of the update.
Once the update is downloaded, the end device verifies that the certificate is
valid and that the file is not modified since its signature [27].
Over the past years, developers implemented and tested several practices
to secure IoT systems [28]. Best practices in IoT security include performing a
threat analysis [29], follow security recommendations, learn from old attacks
and apply design patterns [30]. More specifically, IoT systems should consider
the following security advices:
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• Consider physical attacks in the threat analysis [31]
• Implement automatic key management [32] and hardware random-
ness [33].
• Utilize only properly evaluated security protocols and key lengths [34].
• Provide a secure upgrade functionality to fix future vulnerabilities [35].
• Not utilize the same key for all the devices because if one device is
compromised the complete system becomes vulnerable [35].
• Following recommendation on protocols such as Transport Layer Se-
cure(TLS) and Datagram TLS to secure communication channels [36].
In addition to these recommendations, there are privacy considerations
that should be included in the development of IoT systems. It is important
to provide the users with awareness about what information is required by
the system. Moreover, the users should consent or not to expose their data.
Additionally, the system should secure sensitive information of the users, e.g.,
geolocation, photos, passwords, contacts and payment info [37].
To ensure platform security, IoT devices could be provided with a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). TEE provides confidentiality and integrity
to the system, i.e., isolating the non-trusted software, data and hardware
from the trusted ones (Figure 2.3). This trusted technology comprises its
own boot, operating system and hardware. Some functionalities are per-
formed in the TEE including secure booting, authentication, payment and
cryptographic operations. In addition to these functionalities, the environ-
ment stores any secret key and performs any sensitive process, e.g., execute
trusted applications updated with OTA [5].
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) presented as num-
ber one vulnerability not securing the backend server. For this reason, a
server implementation should consider OWASP risk analysis on most com-
mon vulnerabilities and recommendations to secure Web applications [38].
In addition to OWASP recommendations, a TEE could be integrated to the
server to secure any sensitive data. However, TEE is not feasible in cloud
solutions, the main reason is that the server could not be migrated because
the TEE is integrated within the hardware. To solve this migration problem,
companies such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) provide another type of se-
cure solution feasible for cloud architecture. For example, Cloud hardware
secure module (CloudHSM) stores sensitive data and performs any crypto-
graphic operations. Furthermore, cloud solutions require a client module in
the backend to communicate with the CloudHSM functionality [39].
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Figure 2.3: Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) overview [5].
Typically, Android OTA updates are Java ARchive (JAR) files. These
JAR files contain metadata inside a META-INF folder. Metadata includes a
MANIFEST.MF file with a header information about the created manifest
and a list of files contained in the JAR. Each of these listed files include an
output after performing a digested hash algorithm to the binary file (e.g.,
Figure 2.4a). The digest algorithm is created with a Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA), which takes the binary file as an input and generates an output of
a specific length. The size of this output depends on the complexity of the
algorithm selected by the user. If the utilized algorithm generates the same
output for two different inputs it is called a collision. These collisions repre-
sent vulnerabilities of the hash algorithm [1]. Table 2.1 shows a comparison
of the SHA algorithms.
Algorithm name Output size (bits) Collision found(80 rounds)
SHA-0 160 Yes
SHA-1 160 Yes
SHA-2 256/384/512 No
Table 2.1: Comparison of Hash Algorithms [1]
JAR files are signed to authenticate the author of the file and to assure the
integrity of the file. In fact, Oracle developed a tool called jarsigner to sign
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: a) Example of a manifest file in a JAR b) Example of the structure
of a JAR.
these JAR files [40]. This library allows the backend to sign the JAR file with
different signing algorithms: DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm), RSA (Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman algorithm) or ECDSA (Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) [41]. Thus, the developer selects the
signing algorithm and the desired key size. However, the JAR is not signed if
the library detects security vulnerabilities in the specified signing parameters
(e.g., chosen digest algorithm and key size), and the signing method returns
an error. Once the JAR file is signed, a signature (i.e., .SF file) is added to
the metadata folder and signature block file (i.e., .DSA, .RSA, or .EC file
depending on the signature algorithm chosen) [40, 42]. Chapter 4.4 evaluates
the performance of the signing algorithms DSA, RSA and ECDSA.
Chapter 3
A System for IoT Software Updates
This chapter describes a system for IoT application provisioning service us-
ing long-range broadcast communication technologies. Firstly, the reference
scenario is introduced along with the main assumptions of the system. Sec-
ondly, the architecture of the system is presented with focus on its high-level
components and use cases. Moreover, a threat model is defined to establish
the security requirements. Finally, the hardware and software architecture of
the system is explained before proceeding with the implementation explained
in Chapter 4.
3.1 Reference Scenario
The reference scenario for the proposed system is a metropolitan area consist-
ing of several heterogeneous IoT devices. There is a large number of devices
in the considered urban scenario, however they belong to a relatively limited
number of classes (or types). Each device type is a platform (e.g., Raspberry
Pi or Edison Board) running a specific OS. Moreover, IoT devices run an OS
and a set of applications which receive software updates. IoT devices have no
Internet connection but are only equipped with a broadcast wireless receiver
suitable for long-range communication (downlink only). These requirements
represent a base for the system design. Figure 3.1 presents such a reference
scenario.
The main idea of the system is to provide the IoT application developers
with a platform to distribute their software updates. Figure 3.2 presents
the architecture for the IoT application provisioning service. This system
contains the following components:
• Backend Server. It is located in the Cloud, and provides an interface
to the IoT app developers to create and schedule software updates.
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Figure 3.1: Reference scenario for the IoT Application Provisioning Service.
Additionally, the backend server is responsible for signing the update
packages, as well as transmitting the packages to the radio transmitter.
• Radio transmitter. Acts as a gateway that communicates with the
backend server by Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet
Protocol (IP) to obtain the update package. Once it obtains the pack-
age, the gateway transmits the data to a long-range broadcast antenna.
Consequently, the antenna broadcasts the data over the radio spectrum
leveraging Radio Data System Protocol [43].
• IoT device. Receives the data corresponding to the update pack-
age through a long-range broadcast receiver (e.g., RTL-SDR dongle).
Moreover, the broadcast receiver is directly attached to the IoT device
with USB cable or some other wired/wireless technology (e.g., thun-
derbolt [44], wireless USB or Bluetooth [45]). Once the update package
is completely received, the device verifies the signature of the package
and installs the new software.
The thesis work focuses on the design of the backend server and of the
supporting software running at the IoT device. Accordingly, we detail these
components next.
To analyze the functionalities of the system and their interactions we
present use case diagrams. Such diagrams show how the actors relate to
the system functionalities. An actor represents users, external hardware, or
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Figure 3.2: Architecture of the IoT Application Provisioning Service.
other subjects that interact with the system [46]. Only the following actors
are considered:
• IoT Application Developer. Interacts with the system to perform
certain actions including logging in, uploading the update package,
modifying personal information and managing the device types. The
IoT developer builds updates for a specific type of device. In fact,
this actor is restricted to perform actions only on the corresponding
updates, device types and profiles owned by him/her.
• Administrator. Possesses full access to the information stored in the
backend server. After passing the authentication process to access the
system, the administrator is allowed to perform several functionalities
including the management of users, device types and updates.
• Radio Transmitter. Receives the signed update from the backend
server.
• IoT device. Obtains the update package broadcasted from the radio
transmitter. The software upgrade process starts after the IoT device
receives the update image completely. Such a device requires a boot-
loader and two independent OSes to implement seamless updates (see
Subchapter 2.2)
Figure 3.3 contains the use cases of the backend server:
• ManageUsers. Includes functionalities to create, edit, view and delete
users. The management of users is accessed by the IoT application
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Figure 3.3: Use cases of the backend server.
developer and the administrator. Furthermore, an user authentication
is required to perform any action.
• Login. Allows users to authenticate with the system and access the
Web application functionalities.
• ManageUpdates. Provides functionalities to create, edit, view and
delete updates. This use case is utilized by the IoT application devel-
oper and the administrator. Furthermore, a previous user authentica-
tion is necessary to execute any function. Additionally, it signs updates
upon creation of the update package.
• ManageDeviceTypes. Offers functionalities such as create, edit,
view and delete device types. These functionalities are utilized by the
IoT application developer and the administrator, and these functional-
ities require the authentication of the user.
• SendUpdate. Runs in the backend server. Once the scheduled time
of the update is reached, it sends the update towards the radio trans-
mitter.
Figure 3.4 presents the following use cases of the IoT device:
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Figure 3.4: Use cases of an IoT device.
• ReceiveUpdate. Receives the data sent by the radio transmitter.
• UpdateSoftware. Processes the received image. Firstly, it includes
the ValidateSignature use case to verify if the update package contains
a valid signature. Afterwards, it runs the update installation process
in the background by applying seamless updates process to install the
OS update in the inactive system and reboot the devices after the
installation. Additionally, it can update the applications installed at
the IoT device without restarting the device.
3.2 Security Requirements
We now present the considered threat model so as to establish the security
objectives of our solution. Threat modelling analyzes vulnerabilities in the
system that can be exploited to perform malicious attacks, as well as mit-
igation measures to avoid these attacks [29]. Firstly, the model determines
the assets of the system. Secondly, the model presents possible attackers and
their motivation. Thirdly, the model specifies some attacks that could be
performed in the system and the mitigation actions for each attack. Finally,
the security goals of the system are established based on the model.
The assets of a system represent valuable components that are vulnerable
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to attacks and could affect its proper operation. The identified assets of the
IoT application provisioning service are:
• Backend Server
• IoT devices
• Image files (i.e., code of the update)
• Reputation of the service
Attacker Motivation
Hacker - Obtain the update code- Control IoT devices
Robber - Obtain physical access to IoT devices
Malicious Employee - Install malicious software into the IoT devices
Competitor Service - Destroy the competition to gain clients for them
Table 3.1: Threat model: Attackers and their motivation.
Table 3.1 identifies the possible attackers of the system and their moti-
vations. The threat model considers hackers as any intruder that interferes
or extracts the data stored, transmitted or processed by the backend server
or end devices. Additionally, the model includes the physical attacks that
could be performed by a robber trying to steal the IoT device. Furthermore,
the competitor service could pay employees to install malicious code into
different nodes of the system to affect the reputation of the service and gain
clients for them.
Attacks Mitigation
Install malicious update - Authenticate users- Only install valid signed updates
Obtain data during transmission - Send encrypted data
Compromise backend server - Harden the backend server security(i.e., with CloudHSM [39])
Compromise IoT devices - Use TEE [5] to secure sensitivedata
Table 3.2: Threat model: Attacks and mitigation measures.
Table 3.2 presents possible attacks to the system and their mitigation.
The described attacks are explained in general terms. For instance, to avoid
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Security goals Description
Confidentiality - Only authorized users should access sensitive data
Integrity - Unauthorized users should not modify data in thesystem
Non-repudiation - The author of the update cannot deny its author-ship
Authentication
- Only authorized users are allowed to access the
backend server
- Verification of the author of the update in IoT de-
vices
Authorization - Only authenticated users are allowed to upload up-dates
Availability - Update service should be running when authorizedusers require it
Table 3.3: Security goals of the IoT Applications Provisioning Service.
the installation of malicious software in the end devices, it is necessary to
authenticate the users that are able to create the update packages and only
install properly signed updates in the IoT device. Although the data en-
cryption is performed prior to the transmission, it does not ensure complete
confidentiality. In fact, unauthorized users can still receive such data. How-
ever, it prevents them from being able to understand the received informa-
tion. In addition to these attacks, if the backend server or the IoT devices
are compromised, it is important to harden the security of the server with
CloudHSM and the end devices with platform security such as TEE. There
are more specific attacks including brute force attack to guess the password
of the user [47], man-in-the-middle (MITM) [48] to obtain or alter transmis-
sion of packets, as well as denial of service (DoS) attacks [49] that restrict
the availability of the system affecting the reputation of the service. To mit-
igate these attacks is necessary to follow general security recommendations,
e.g., allow only a certain number of login attempts per username, employ
Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) [50]
and analyze the requests rate in the server to detect any anomaly. Moreover,
it is necessary to apply company rules to prevent that an employee releases
a malicious update, e.g., the release process could require a prior approval
of at least two employees. Additionally, the evaluation of the backend server
implementation should be based on recommendations from About The Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) about most critical risks on
website applications [38].
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The security goals of the system are described in Table 3.3. Based on this
threat model and the scope of the thesis, we will focus on providing the system
with authentication and integrity during the upgrade process. Furthermore,
the system should offer confidentiality of the transmitted sensitive data.
3.3 HW/SW Architecture
The HW/SW architecture of the system is based on the previously introduced
system design and its requirements. The system is independent of the wireless
communication technology, hence we only consider two components: the
backend server and the IoT device. Figure 3.5 shows the architecture of such
components.
Figure 3.5: HW/SW Architecture of the IoT Application Provisioning Ser-
vice.
The backend server includes an OS, where are implemented the function-
alities to manage updates, devices and users. Moreover, the server requires a
connectivity layer to connect to Internet to expose its services and send data
towards the radio transmitter. Furthermore, the server possesses a hardware
secure module client (HSMClient) that requests to the cloud hardware secure
module (CloudHSM) to execute any sensitive operation of the system. The
CloudHSM stores all the security keys. This architecture allows to migrate
the backend server and utilize the same CloudHSM.
The IoT device runs an OS. Inside this OS, one or more applications
could be installed in the system. Besides, a communication layer is required
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to connect a radio broadcast receiver (e.g., RTL-SDR dongle) to obtain an
update. Furthermore, a software upgrade service is installed to process the
incoming updates and execute seamless updates. Additionally, a TEE is
implemented in the device to store the security keys and run any trusted
operations including the secure boot of the system.
Integrity requires that the backend server contains a private key to sign
updates and the sent data. If several backend servers are involved, the
CloudHSM stores as many keys as servers. However, one key is sufficient for
one backend server (see Figure 3.5). Additionally, to provide confidentiality,
a shared key is required between the backend server and the IoT device to
encrypt sensitive information. The shared key is device type-specific and it
is configured in the IoT devices by the manufacturer.
The presented architecture enables the creation of updates for a specific
type of devices and its distribution through a wireless transmission technol-
ogy to be received by the IoT devices. Such architecture allows seamless
updates to update any partition in the hard disk of the IoT devices and pro-
vides higher availability time. However, the unidirectional communication
provides no acknowledgement feature, hence the IoT devices cannot com-
municate with the backend server, reducing the reliability of the system.
Additionally, the system design would compromise all the device types that
share the same key if one of shared keys is exposed.
Chapter 4
Seamless Updates Prototype
This chapter details the implementation of the seamless update prototype.
After an overview of the prototype, the chapter describes the Web application
on the backend server. Furthermore, the chapter explains the development of
the system upgrade service in the IoT device. Finally, the chapter evaluates
the performance of the prototype, in terms of the time taken for the different
phases of the update process at the embedded device.
4.1 Prototype Overview
Raspberry Pi
TCP/IP
Backend Server
IoT App
Developer
Figure 4.1: Prototype architecture.
The thesis work focuses on the implementation of the update service at
the IoT device and the backend server, thus the long-range broadcast com-
munication is not contemplated in the prototype. Figure 4.1 presents the
architecture of the seamless update prototype. The IoT application devel-
oper uploads a device type-specific update to the backend server through a
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Web application. The backend server publishes the software updates. The
IoT device, i.e., Raspberry Pi in this prototype, requests the backend server
for a new update for its device type. If a new version is found on the server,
the IoT device downloads the update and performs seamless updates during
the installation process. The prototype leverages TCP/IP as a communi-
cation protocol between the Raspberry Pi and the backend server. Such
communication could be replaced in the future by a long-range broadcast
technology with trivial modifications in code.
4.2 Web Application
The Web Application is implemented in a backend server. The server con-
figuration includes:
• Linux-based OS, Ubuntu version 16.04
• Apache HTTP Server, version 2.4.18
• MySQL database, version 5.7.18
• PHP scripting language, version 7.0.18
• OpenJDK, version 1.8.0_131
Figure 4.2: Model-View-Controller architecture [6, 7].
The application employs the CakePHP framework (version 3.4) to build
the website. This framework leverages Model-View-Controller (MVC) archi-
tectural pattern [7] to facilitate software programming. Figure 4.2 shows how
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CakePHP handles requests and responses of the user, as well as the commu-
nication between different components. To start, the user sends a request to
the controller. Then, the controller calls to the models for information. Sub-
sequently, models communicate with the database to obtain information and
send it back to the controller. To finish the process, the controller invokes a
view that presents the response to the user. Moreover, CakePHP offers sev-
eral tools to apply security measures to the website, including the OWASP
recommendations on most known vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and
Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention [38].
The website implements the use cases described in Figure 3.3 including:
• Login. Figure 4.3 presents the website to authenticate the user with
username and password. The backend determines whether the user is
an administrator or not, restricting the non-administrators from certain
functionalities including the creation of users and the modification of
information from other users.
Figure 4.3: Login functionality.
• Users Management. Figure 4.4 shows the page that requests rele-
vant information to create a new user: username, password, type (ad-
ministrator or not) and access status (active or inactive). Only the
administrator is able to create new users. Furthermore, normal users
are allowed to only modify their information. One security measure im-
plemented is to store the password hashed into the MySQL database
instead of saving it as plain text. Furthermore, non-active users are
unable to login into the system.
• Device Types Management. Figure 4.5 displays the website that
requires only the name to store a new device type. All the users of
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Figure 4.4: Add new user functionality.
the system are allowed to create device types, as well as to modify and
remove these created device types. However, only administrators can
modify and remove device types from other users.
Figure 4.5: Add new device type functionality.
• Updates Management. Figure 4.6 shows the page to add a new
update. The page requests the name, version, schedule time, device
type and the file to create it. After the file is uploaded, the backend
creates an update JAR file with the uploaded file and signs it with
the private key of the server. The signature is performed with the
jarsigner library [40]. This library is currently utilized by Android to
sign their updates and supports three signing algorithms: DSA, RSA
and ECDSA.
• Send Update. The prototype does not implement the functionality
to send the update to the radio transmitter. However, the backend
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Figure 4.6: Add new update functionality.
allows updates to be available only after a scheduled time. To this
end, it employs a cron job that runs every minute to trigger the Web
application and search if there is any scheduled update to be released.
If so, the newly schedule update is made available to the IoT devices
for download.
4.3 IoT System Upgrade Service
For the prototype, the system upgrade service is implemented in a Raspberry
Pi 3 (RPi3). The RPi3 enables the implementation of the HW and SW
architecture presented in Figure 3.5. However, the utilized IoT device does
not include a TEE. The configuration of the IoT device requires New Out of
the Box Software (NOOBS) version 2.4 to install two OSes in the same disk.
NOOBS acts as a bootloader, deciding which system is going to boot, i.e.,
either system A or B (see Subsection 2.2). These two systems are installed
in the SD card along with NOOBS. The chosen Linux-based OS is Raspbian
Lite (also known as Jessie) version 8 to save space in the Secure Digital (SD)
memory card.
Additionally, the IoT device requires a desktop environment such as
PIXEL (version 1.2) that provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for Rasp-
bian Lite. PIXEL includes preinstalled applications for certain purposes in-
cluding calendar, games and programming [51]. Finally, Oracle JDK version
1.8.0_65 is necessary to leverage jarsigner library to verify the signature of
the received JAR file.
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Table 4.1 shows all the partitions of the SD card1. Figure 4.7 presents
a visual description of the partitions with system A and B specified to im-
plement seamless updates. Each system A/B is an independent Raspbian
Lite OS with their own boot and a root partitions. Typically, there is a
maximum of four primary partitions on the SD card. For instance, this SD
card is provided with only two, i.e., the RECOVERY partition in charge
of the boot process and the extended partition. To allow more than four
partitions, the extended partition contains the rest of the partitions as log-
ical partitions. The SETTINGS partition contains all the configuration of
NOOBS, e.g., which operating systems are installed and which OS is the de-
fault one [2]. Figure 4.8 displays the RPi3 running on system A and showing
all the partitions of the SD card.
Primary
partition
Logical
partition Type Label Contents
1 FAT RECOVERY
NOOBS boot files &
initramsfs2, OS recov-
ery images
2 extended Any logical partitions
5 ext4 SETTINGS NOOBS settings
6 FAT boot System A - RaspbianLite boot files
7 ext4 root System A - RaspbianLite filesystem
8 FAT boot0 System B - RaspbianLite boot files
9 ext4 root0 System B - RaspbianLite filesystem
Table 4.1: SD card partitions [2].
The software of the system upgrade service is implemented as a shell
script. The script has to search for the current version and device type
on the IoT. Afterwards, it requests any available update in the Web server
by providing the current version with a version greater than the current
one. If it finds an update (i.e., a newer version of the device type), the
update service downloads the file through Internet. Once the download is
completed, the script verifies the certificate of the update file and the integrity
of the JAR file through its signature. Then, it updates the relevant partition.
1The prototype utilized a 16GB card
2Initial RAM file system [52].
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Figure 4.7: Structure of SD card with seamless update.
Figure 4.8: Raspberry Pi 3 partitions running in system A.
Once it finishes with the installation, it instructs the bootloader to boot the
system with the newest version. Consequently, it requests the user to reboot
the system, hence the device restarts and the bootloader tries to start the
updated partition. In case the new partition is not bootable, the old version
of the system is still accessible on the SD card and can be rolled back if
needed. Additionally, if none of the systems are bootable, the NOOBS allows
to reinstall the two OSes from an image saved in the RECOVERY partition.
Furthermore, an implementation with Linux frame buffer image viewer
(fbi) package enables the prototype to display splash screen with the current
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version of the device at the booting time before entering to the GUI [53].
Figure 4.9a shows the splash screen for a device with version 1.0. The pro-
totype only considers incremental updates, i.e., from version 1.0 the device
only upgrades to 2.0, it cannot skip any updates. This implementation could
be modified in code to allow several upgrades in the same update package to
install the latest version by executing only once the upgrading service.
To verify the device type and version of the update, the manifest in the
JAR file provides the following information in the header:
Manifest−Vers ion : 1 . 0
Device−Type : RaspberryPi3A_42
Update−Vers ion : 2 . 0
Created−By : 1 . 8 . 0 _131 ( Oracle Corporat ion )
Name : 2 . 0 5 . z ip
SHA−256−Digest : vIlJ4fO8TWBahOI/13STSK1NPd23dUvxhvy2NZkuLW4=
Listing 4.1: Manifest file for system upgrade service
Figure 4.9 demonstrates the phases to execute the seamless update pro-
totype. Firstly, the RPi3 boots and displays as a splash screen Figure 4.9a
to show the current version 1.0. Secondly, Figure 4.9b displays highlighted
the current boot partition mmcblk0p6, thus the device is running system A.
Moreover, the output of the system upgrade shell script is presented in Fig-
ure 4.9c. As previously mentioned, the script downloads, verifies, installs the
new boot version and requests the user to reboot the IoT device. Conse-
quently, the RPi3 reboots after the software update and show Figure 4.9d
as splash screen with the updated version 2.0. Finally, the IoT device swaps
to run system B with the latest installed version. As expected, Figure 4.9e
highlights the new boot partition mmcblk0p8, hence the upgrade is successful
and the new version is properly running on system B.
This system upgrade service runs in the background, thus it allows the
user to continue working with the IoT device. The seamless updates imple-
mentation enables to update any partition of the system and provides more
availability time of the devices, removing the unavailability of the IoT device
during the installation time.
4.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the prototype implementation, the system upgrade service is
executed five times in the RPi3 with the time command to obtain the real
time to run the script, then determine its average performance. Time is the
only considered metric in the evaluation. The device implements seamless
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(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 4.9: Example of the system upgrade service. a) Splash screen of an
IoT device with version 1.0. b) Console output of the FS of a device running
in system A. c) System upgrade service console output. d) Splash screen
of an IoT device with version 2.0. e) Console output of the FS of a device
running in system B.
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updates, hence the installation is performed in the background. The evalua-
tion includes the time to download, to write to the inactive A/B system and
the rest of actions to accomplish the update: the validation of the signature,
the modification of the boot files, as well as the update of the splash screen.
Table 4.2 shows the time to install the update in the IoT device3 and Table
4.3 presents the performance of the system upgrade service as a whole, spec-
ifying the total time of installation with rebooting time. The results of the
evaluation demonstrate that the IoT device is updated in less than a minute
and a half whereas the total unavailability time is approximately 36 seconds
thanks to the implementation of seamless updates.
Functionality Min. time(seconds)
Max. time
(seconds)
Average time
(seconds)
Download 2.8 2.8 2.8
Write in partition 21.69 22.21 21.99
Rest of the script 18.26 21.72 20.17
Installation Time 42.75 46.73 44.97
Table 4.2: Performance in installation process.
Functionality Min. time(seconds)
Max. time
(seconds)
Average time
(seconds)
System Upgrade Service 42.75 46.73 44.97
Reboot 32.67 37.43 35.25
Total Time 75.42 84.16 80.22
Table 4.3: Performance in system upgrade service.
Another important aspect is the performance of verifying digital signa-
tures at the IoT device. Our experiments involve signing several JAR files
with different parameters including the signing algorithm, the digest hash
algorithm and the key size. Moreover, each JAR file is verified four times
to obtain the verification time. The metrics of the evaluation involve the
time to verify the file and the size of the files after being signed with the
different parameters. More specifically, to define the signing parameters it
is necessary to follow the security recommendations and standards on dig-
ital signatures [54], key management [55] and secure hashes [56] of the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as well as the specifi-
cations and restrictions of Oracle JDK [57]. For instance, NIST recommends
3The update size is 32.3 MB
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the usage of ECDSA in IoT devices because of its performance and efficiency,
i.e., it provides higher security4 than RSA/DSA with smaller keys. For this
reason, ECDSA is evaluated utilizing two different key sizes 224 and 571 to
analyze how its performance is affected by the size of the key. Additionally,
the RSA is evaluated with a key size of 2048 to provide a similar security
as the 224 key of ECDSA [58]. Typically, the maximum key size of DSA is
1024 based on the restrictions established by Oracle JDK [57]. Furthermore,
Oracle follows NIST recommendations, hence the JAR file is not signed if
the specified parameters do not follow the security standards, or if they do
not comply with key size restrictions of Oracle.
Signing Algorithm Key Size File size(bytes)
Verification Time
on RPi3
(seconds)
DSA 1024 63324572 4.913
RSA 2048 63324817 4.902
ECDSA 224 63324232 4.91
ECDSA 571 63324505 5.205
Table 4.4: Experiments performed for update files using SHA-1 digest algo-
rithm.
The first group of experiments are performed utilizing SHA-1 as digest
hash algorithm. Table 4.4 shows the performance results for each signing
algorithm and key size. Figure 4.10 also presents the measured times. The
difference between the DSA(1024), RSA(2048) and ECDSA(224) is less than
10 milliseconds. Only ECDSA(517) increased the time difference due to a
key size which provides higher security than the other signing options. As
expected, for one algorithm, the time increases with the key size. The verifi-
cation time is the lowest than the other two digest algorithms, SHA-224 and
SHA-256. However, the collisions found in SHA-1 represent vulnerabilities
on the algorithm. For this reason, NIST recommends to utilize SHA-2 for
new applications.
Additionally, a second group of experiments leverages SHA-224 digest
algorithm with different signing algorithms. Table 4.5 presents time results of
the experiments, while Figure 4.10 shows the time difference. The evaluated
time difference is a little more than 10 milliseconds comparing DSA(1024)
to RSA(2048) and ECDSA(224). As previously mentioned, ECDSA(571)
time is higher than the other three cases. This SHA-224 digest algorithm is
recommended by NIST for applications from 2016 until 2030 [58].
4Higher security means that is less vulnerable or increases the complexity to be hacked.
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Signing Algorithm Key Size File size(bytes)
Verification Time
on RPi3
(seconds)
DSA 1024 63324609 6.1935
RSA 2048 63324861 6.16575
ECDSA 224 63324283 6.169625
ECDSA 571 63324556 6.42435
Table 4.5: Experiments performed signing update files using SHA-224 digest
algorithm.
Signing Algorithm Key Size File size(bytes)
Verification Time
on RPi3
(seconds)
DSA 1024 63324626 6.20275
RSA 2048 63324858 6.1705
ECDSA 224 63324292 6.17775
ECDSA 571 63324566 6.43475
Table 4.6: Experiments performed for update files using SHA-256 digest
algorithm.
The last set of experiments is performed with SHA-256 digest hash al-
gorithm. Table 4.6 presents the measured times. The obtained values are
the highest of the three sets of experiments, as SHA-256 requires more time
to be executed than SHA-1 and SHA-224. Figure 4.10 demonstrates the be-
havior of the signing algorithms, which is very similar comparing the three
groups of experiments. Furthermore, analyzing the size of the three signing
algorithms, ECDSA files are smaller in bytes than with the other two.
The evaluation demonstrates that the performance is affected when secu-
rity is increased, i.e., SHA-1 is faster but provides less security than SHA-2
algorithms. Similarly, the verification time increases with the key size of
ECDSA. Moreover, ECDSA offers at least the same level of security as RSA
or DSA with smaller keys. As a result, the size of their signed files is smaller
than the other two signing algorithms. For future IoT applications, the ne-
cessity to increase the security with a lower amount of resources demands
ECDSA as a more suitable solution for embedded devices.
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Figure 4.10: Comparing the performance of different signing parameters.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis presented an architectural solution that provides software up-
dates for IoT devices leveraging long-range broadcast communications. The
reference scenario and threat model provided requirements of the system in
terms of components, protocols and security goals. Additionally, a seamless
updates prototype was implemented for an IoT device based on the solu-
tion in ChromeOS/Android to extend the availability time of the devices
during the updating process and upgrade any partition of their system. Fur-
thermore, the broadcast provisioning service groups IoT devices by different
device types to distribute and manage their software updates in the Backend
Server through a Web application.
The design of the solution is compliant with security measures on IoT
devices about key sizes, signing algorithms and cryptographic protocols. In
addition to these recommendations, the designed structure of the IoT device
includes a TEE to provide platform security, while the backend server design
implements a CloudHSM to execute any sensitive functionality and store
private data. However, it is important to take into account the most known
vulnerabilities of OWASP on Web Applications such as SQL injection and
XSS in the backend implementation.
The proposed IoT Application Provisioning Service does not rely on a
specific communication as long as it is long-range broadcast digital data. Al-
though the implemented prototype requires Internet connection on the IoT
device, it could be easily modified to leverage any long-range broadcast com-
munication technology. Consequently, the system represents a cheaper option
to provide software updates to a wide area in terms of infrastructure than
other cellular or multi-hop short-range wireless communication technologies.
The project could require a scalable Cloud solution on the backend to
handle a large amount of IoT application developers and embedded devices.
Other improvements include leveraging incremental cryptography, i.e., the
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idea is that once the hash value of a file is computed, it is not required to re-
compute it entirely if the file is modified, hence executing the hash algorithm
only in the modified section of the file [59]. Incremental cryptography en-
ables faster cryptographic operations increasing the efficiency of the systems,
hence it could be applied on incremental updates to avoid recomputing the
entire files in the update package. Besides, to increase the reliability of the
wireless transmission, fountain codes or Reed-Solomon codes could be imple-
mented to mitigate any packet loss while transmitting data to the embedded
devices [60]. In addition, a multicast encryption could be implemented to
improve the confidentiality of the system. Multicast encryption would al-
low only a group of end devices to access the sent update image. However,
the current multicast encryption solutions require rekeying functionality to
update the shared key of the members of the group each time a member en-
ters or exits the group. According to the proposed provisioning service, only
unidirectional communication is present on the system, thus there could not
be a confirmation if all the devices received the new key and modified their
old one. For this reason, this type of key management functionality on a
large scale of devices would not be suitable on an urban scenario and it is
not feasible for the current assumptions of the presented IoT Application
Provisioning Service [61, 62].
As a future work, the solution should be modified to utilize a long-range
broadcast communication technology in a real environment. The seamless
updates prototype should be extended to support other types of embedded
devices including Edison Board, Arduino and Banana Pi, as well as to im-
plement several functionalities including the rollback process, the number of
remaining boot attempts and the encryption of the updates. Moreover, the
system could update the device directly to the latest update (i.e., instead of
incremental updates) and the IoT device should compress the size of the file
system to save space in the hard disk. All these modifications will increase
the efficiency of the presented solution.
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